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Through introducing controlled alternative quantum walks, we present controlled alternate quan-
tum walks (CAQW) based quantum hash function. CAQW based quantum hash function have
excellent security, outstanding statistical performance and splendid expansibility. Furthermore,
due to the structure of alternative quantum walks, implementing CAQW based quantum hash
function significantly reduces the resources necessary for its feasible experimental realization than
implementing other quantum hash functions. Besides, CAQW based quantum hash function has
expansibility.
Hash function, as an important part of modern cryptography, has widely applications in message au-
thentication, signature protocol and Public Key Infrastructure. There are many theoretical studies about
classical hash functions and mature hash functions such as MD5, SHA1 and SHA512. These hash func-
tions are generally constructed based on mathematics complexity and thus they are computationally secure.
Now classical hash functions are used extensively in quantum protocols to ensure the safety of quantum
communication
[1]
, yet it is contradictory with the fact that the quantum computer could solve difficult
mathematical problems. For the reason above, Li et. al. presented a kind of quantum hash function based
on two-particle controlled interacting quantum walks (CIQW)
[2, 3]
. This quantum hash function guarantees
the security of hash function by infinite possibilities of the initial state and the irreversibility of measurement
rather than hard mathematic problems. In Ref. [4], Yang et. al. improved the CIQW based quantum
hash function and found its applications in the privacy amplification process of quantum key distribution,
pseudorandom number generation and image encryption. But this quantum hash function still have two
unsatisfactory defects. One of that is for the quantum hash function
[2, 3]
, predictable collisions happens
for some special states as initial coin state. The second one is that realization of controlled two-particle
interacting quantum walks needs more resource than one-particle quantum walks. Therefore, we present the
quantum hash function based on controlled alternate quantum walks (CAQW) here to avoid these defects.
Quantum walk, one famous quantum computation model, has widely applications in quantum computa-
tion and quantum information
[5–11]
. Alternate quantum walk is a kind of quantum walk which attracts a lot
of attentions
[12–19]
. Di Franco et. al.
[12, 13]
proposed a two-dimensional quantum walk where the requirement
of a higher dimensionality of the coin space is substituted with the alternance of the directions in which the
walker can move. They also proposed the N-dimensional alternate quantum walk and discussed some of its
properties through the analysis of the dispersion relation
[14]
. Then, the authors found
[15]
that by properly
choosing the measurement basis, the x − y spatial entanglement can be increased with respect to the value
obtained with the measurement on the computational basis. They also studied the localizationlike effect
in two-dimensional alternate quantum walk with periodic coin operations
[16]
. In Ref. [17], Machida and
Chandrashekar presented a three-state alternate quantum walk on a two-dimensional lattice and discussed
its localization and limit laws. Recently, Bru et. al. considered the two-dimensional alternate quantum walk
on a cylinder
[18]
. Chen and Zhang revealed the quantum and classical behaviors of the two-dimensional
alternative quantum walk in the presence of decoherence
[19]
.
Results
CAQW based quantum hash function
At first, we propose CAQW for constructing quantum hash function.
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CAQW take place in the product spaceHp
⊗
Hc. Let | x, y, γ〉 be a basis state, where x, y and γ represent
the walker’s position and the coin state respectively.
In every step of the CAQW, the evolution of the whole system can be described by the global unitary
operator, denoted by U ,
U = Sy(I ⊗ C)Sx(I ⊗ C). (1)
The shift operator Sx is defined as
Sx =

 ∑
x∈{1···n−1}
| x+ 1 〉〈 x|+ | 1 〉〈 n|

⊗ | ↑ 〉〈 ↑ |
+

 ∑
x∈{2···n}
| x− 1 〉〈 x|+ | n 〉〈 1|

⊗ | ↓ 〉〈 ↓ |.
(2)
And Sy is similar to Sx. The coin operator C is a 2×2 unitary operator. The general coin operator is defined
as
C =
(
cos(θ) sin(θ)
sin(θ) −cos(θ)
)
. (3)
For CAQW, we randomly select two parameters θ1, θ2 to construct two coin operators C0 and C1. The choice
of the coin operator is controlled by a binary string, i.e. message. When the nth bit of the message is 0(1),
the nth step of the quantum walk executes with the coin operator C0(C1). For example, if the message is
0100, the final state is expressed by
|ψ4〉 = U0U0U1U0|ψ0〉, (4)
where |ψ0〉 is the initial state of the total quantum system, U0 = Sy(I ⊗ C0)Sx(I ⊗ C0), U1 = Sy(I ⊗
C1)Sx(I ⊗ C1).
Hence the probability of finding the walker at position (x, y) after t steps is
P (x, y, t) =
∑
γ∈{↑,↓}
| 〈x, y, γ|U(message)|ψ0〉 |
2, (5)
where U(message) is the global unitary operator controlled by the message.
Then, the CAQW based quantum hash function is constructed as follows.
1) Select the parameters (n, k, (θ1, θ2), (α, β)). θ1, θ2 ∈ (0, pi/2) and |α|
2 + |β|2 = 1.
2) Run the two-dimensional CAQW under the control of the message. Each direction of the two-
dimensional space is a n-length circle. θ1, θ2 are the parameters of the two coin operators respectively.
The initial state is |0, 0〉(α|0〉+ β|1〉).
3) Multiply all values in the resulting probability distribution by 108 modulo 2k to form a binary string
as the hash value. The bit length of the hash value is n2k.
Security of CAQW based quantum hash function
Security of CAQW based quantum hash function is based on the infinite possibilities of the initial state
and the irreversibility of measurement and modulo operator.
By using modulo operator, probability distribution is transformed to hash value. This process is irre-
versible because it is a many-to-one relationship. The probability to transform the hash value back to right
probability distribution is approximately 0. It is the first shield to prevent message and initial coin state
from unauthorized person.
The second shield of this quantum hash function is the irreversibility of measurement. The final state of
CAQW is
|ψt〉 = U(message)|ψ0〉 =
∑
x,y
∑
γ∈{↑,↓}
λx,y,γ | x, y, γ 〉. (6)
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This state is a pure state and is linear with the initial state. The probability distribution is
P (x, y, t) =
∑
γ
| 〈x, y, γ|U(message)|ψ0〉 |
2 =
∑
γ
| λx,y,γ |
2. (7)
As a result, one can get the probability distribution easily by a quantum computer or a classical computer.
However, the probability distribution is the sum of squares of amplitudes which will break the linearity
between the final state and the initial state.
If an unauthorized person Eve has plaintext-cipher pairs, he still can not turn the probability distribution
into the right linear composition of squares of amplitudes, let alone he doesn’t have the accurate probability
distribution. This is because of the infinity of decomposing a number as the sum of squares,
P (x, y, t) =
∑
γ
| λx,y,γ |
2 =
∑
γ
| λ
′
x,y,γ |
2. (8)
Then, Eve can only suppose the final state is
|ψ
′
t〉 =
∑
x,y
∑
γ
λ
′
x,y,γ | x, y, γ 〉. (9)
Therefore, he can not get the right initial state even he knows the right message.
|ψ
′
0〉 = U(message)
−1|ψ
′
t〉. (10)
This process protects the initial coin state from any unauthorized person. Together with the infinite possi-
bilities of the initial state which is aleph-one, even with a powerful quantum computer, nobody can seek out
the initial state by trying all possibilities in theory.
Properties of CAQW based quantum hash function
In this section, we performed several hash tests and theoretical analysis to evaluate the performance of
the proposed quantum hash function. We choose n = 5, k = 8, so the hash value we consider here is 200
bits. The result shows that CAQW based quantum hash function have outstanding statistical performance.
Sensitivity of hash value to message
C1,C2,C3 and C4 represent the message, and the messages with tiny modifications respectively. The
results listed below show the high sensitivity to the message and the tiny changes.
Condition 1: The original message;
Condition 2: Change the 8th bit from 0 to 1;
Condition 3: Delete the last bit of the message;
Condition 4: Insert a bit in front of the 100th bit.
The corresponding 200-bit hash values in the hexadecimal format are given by:
Condition 1: F4D7DFFE8A6F9269CFF39B665D9D33FFE0912551E598438C35;
Condition 2: 9714B30709B92AC7DBC6909D95F8C5DE85F7907BD5430953E1;
Condition 3: B9CF2BA89451E17A5BC2AFEF7072A7A1AC469A644FB754B773;
Condition 4: D709199C062129047E6C68F4D5DEE1EE4E0307490A92A7CE90.
The plots of the hash values are shown respectively in Fig. 1 and it is clearly indicated that any tiny
modification to the message will cause a substantial change in the final hash value.
Statistical analysis of diffusion and confusion
The diffusion and confusion tests are performed as follows:
(1) Select a message and generate the corresponding hash value;
(2) Change one bit of the message randomly and generate a new hash value;
(3) Compare the two hash values and count the changed bits called Bi;
(4) Repeat steps (1) to (3) N times.
Given the definitions:
Minimum changed bit number Bmin = min({Bi}
N
1
);
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Figure 1: Plots of the 200-bit Hash Value C1, C2, C3 and C4
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Table 1: Static Number of Changed Bit B
N = 1024 N = 2048 N = 10000
B 100.1553 100.2036 99.9010
P (%) 50.0776 50.1018 49.9505
△B 7.1816 7.0323 7.1133
△P 3.5908 3.5162 3.5567
Bmin 77 77 75
Bmax 121 124 124
Maximum changed bit number Bmax = max({Bi}
N
1
);
Mean changed bit number B =
∑N
i=1Bi/N ;
Mean changed probability P = (B/200)× 100%;
Standard variance of the changed bit number △B =
√
1
N−1
∑N
i=1(Bi −B)
2;
Standard variance of the changed probability △P =
√
1
N−1
∑N
i=1(Bi/200− P )
2 × 100%.
The diffusion and confusion tests are perforemed with N = 1024, 2048, 10000, respectively, as shown in
Table 1. We concluded from the tests that the mean changed bit number B and the mean changed probability
P are close to the ideal value 100 and 50% respectively. △B and △P are very little, Bmin and Bmax are
around 100, so that it demonstrates the stability of diffusion and confusion. The excellent statistical effect
ensures that it is impossible to forge plaintext-cipher pairs given known plaintext-cipher pairs.
Collision analysis
It is hard to provide a mathematical proof on the capability of collision resistance of chaotic hash functions.
Thus, we performed the following tests for collision resistance:
(1) Select an original message randomly and generate the corresponding hash value in ASCII format.
(2) Change a bit in the message randomly and generate the corresponding hash value in ASCII format.
(3) Compare these two hash values and count the number of ASCII characters with the same value at
the same location.
Moreover, the number of ASCII characters with the same value at the same location, i.e. ω, and the
theoretical number of ω same values through N independent tests, i.e. WN (ω) can be computed according
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to the following formulas:
ω =
n2∑
i=1
δ(ei − e
′
i), where δ(x) is the Dirac delta function. (11)
WN (ω) = N × Prob{ω} = N
n2!
ω!(n2 − ω)!
(
1
2k
)ω (
1−
1
2k
)n2−ω
(12)
where ei and e
′
i are the ith entries of the original and new hash values in ASCII format, respectively. In
equation 11, ω = 0, 1, · · · , n2. We run this test N = 10, 000 times. The experimental values and the of
experimental values WN (ω) in the proposed function are shown in Table 2. The experimental values of
WN (ω) are similar to the theoretical values.
Table 2: Comparison of Experimental Values and Theoretical Values of WN (ω)
ω = 0 ω = 1 ω = 2 ω = 3 ω = 4 · · · 25
Experimental Values of WN (ω) 8982 989 25 4 0
Theoretical Values of WN (ω) 9068 889 42 1 0
Uniform distribution on hash space
In order to check the distribution capacity in hash space, we generated two hash values according to the
method described in previous subsection and then counted the number of the changed bits at each location.
The statistical results for N = 10, 000 are shown in Fig. 2. The mean of the changed bit number 4998.2 is
very close to the ideal value 5000, which accounts for half of the test times. It can be concluded that the
hash value is distributed uniformly in the hash space as all the changed bit numbers are around the ideal
value. Obviously, this demonstrates the resistance against statistical attack.
Figure 2: Uniform Distribution on Hash Space.
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Resistance to birthday attack
Birthday attack implies a lower bound of the length of hash value. The length of the hash value we
considered here is 200 = 52 × 8 bits. Therefore, it needs 2n/2 = 2100 ≈ 1.2677× 1030 trials (n is the size of
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hash value) to find two messages with identical hash values with a probability of 1/2. Furthermore, CAQW
based quantum hash function can be easily extended to be 392 = 72× 8 bits or more. Therefore, the results
of the tests, the size of the hash value, and the collision resistance of the proposed algorithm suggest that
the birthday attack is almost impossible and that the proposed algorithm is resistant against this type of
attack.
Advantages
Through the analysis above, we find that CAQW based quantum hash function has outstanding statisti-
cally performance, which is basically same with CIQW based quantum hash function. However, at the same
time, CAQW based quantum hash function has some advantages than CIQW based quantum hash function
due to the structure of CAQW.
In Ref. [2], we considered two interactions: I-interaction and pi-phase interaction. I-interaction and
pi-phase interaction are in fact a coin operator spanned by two 2 × 2 unitary operators. But CIQW with
these two interactions have predictable collisions that quantum walks with same special initial coin state but
different messages may have the same probability distribution. In Ref. [3,4], to avoid this kind of collisions,
the Grover operator, a swap operator
[20]
and the coin operator E
[21]
are chosen. But it is more hard to
implement these 4× 4 coin operators than a coin operator spanned by two 2× 2 unitary operators.
CAQW use the 2 × 2 coin operator in Euq. 3 to control the movement of the quantum walker on two
directions. By selecting two values as the parameter θ, two coin operators for CAQW can be constructed.
Our tests prove that predictable collisions do not happen in CAQW. The more important advantage of
CAQW is that implementing two 2× 2 unitary operators significantly reduces the resources necessary for its
feasible experimental realization than implementing a coin operator spanned by two 2× 2 unitary operators,
let alone a 4× 4 coin operator.
A comparison about three kinds of quantum walks is shown at Table 1. C2 and C4 denote coin operators
of size 2× 2 and 4× 4 respectively. It is obviously that CAQW is the best of them for building a quantum
hash function from the aspect of safety and implementability.
Table 3: Comparison of Three Kinds of Quantum Walks
CIQW in Ref. [2] CIQW in Ref. [3, 4] CAQW
Two particles Two particles One particle
Two directions Two directions Two directions
Sxy(I ⊗ C2 ⊗ C2) Sxy(I ⊗ C4) SyC2SxC2
Predictable collisions NO NO
Another important advantage of CAQW is that two-dimensional CAQW can be easily extended to higher
dimensional CAQW. That means it is easy to construct a hash function with longer hash value. For example,
when N = 5, k = 8, the bit length of the Hash value is 1000 = 53 ∗ 8 for three-dimensional CAQW based
quantum Hash scheme, while the bit length of the Hash value is 200 = 52 ∗ 8 for two-dimensional CAQW
based quantum Hash scheme.
Discussion
In this paper, based on the presentation of controlled alternative quantum walks, we introduce CAQW
based quantum hash function. Security of CAQW based quantum hash function is based on the infinite
possibilities of the initial state and the irreversibility of measurement and modulo operator. Furthermore,
CAQW based quantum hash function has outstanding statistical performance from the aspects of sensitivity,
diffusion and confusion, collision, uniform distribution, resistance to birthday attack. More importantly, due
to the structure of alternative quantum walks, CAQW based quantum hash function has some advantages
than CIQW based quantum hash functions. CAQW based quantum hash function doesn’t have predictable
collisions in Ref. [2]. Furthermore, implementing CAQW based quantum hash function significantly reduces
the resources necessary for its feasible experimental realization than implementing CIQW based quantum
hash functions in Ref. [2–4]. Also, two-dimensional CAQW based quantum hash function can be easily
extended to be higher dimensional CAQW based quantum hash function, which will speed up implementing
200 bits quantum hash function. Therefore, CAQW based quantum hash function is eligible for privacy
amplification in quantum key distribution, pseudo-random number generation and image encryption [4].
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